INTRODUCTION
For just under a decade, the NYPD engaged in a deliberate program of stopping and frisking individuals throughout the city, concentrated in certain areas, for the stated purpose of suppressing crime. Throughout this period of aggressive policing, the number of police stops increased from 160,851 in 2003 to a peak of 685,724 in 2011.1 The program came to a screeching halt on August 12, 2013, when Judge Shira Scheindlin issued a ruling in Floyd v City of New York,2 holding that the NYPD had engaged in a practice of unconstitutional stops and frisks. 3 By the end of 2013, the NYPD posted fewer than 200,000 stops, down from more than half a million the year prior. 4 Between 2011 and 2013, New York City's homicide count declined by 35 percent. 5 The relationship between the NYPD's program and the city's astonishing decline in crime was a focal point in the national debate about the Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) strategy, even though as a legal matter the issue remained on the sidelines.6 The NYPD and former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg claimed that SQF was a good policy choice because it reduced violent crime by deterring people from carrying guns. 7 The Floyd plaintiffs alleged that the stops and frisks were part of a policy and practice that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution.8 Those supporting the defendants responded that the stops were consistent with the law and that the high number of stops and frisks-especially those in the city's higher-crime areas-kept crime low, largely benefitting the very people who were complaining. 9 This back and forth raises a question: Is there a way to understand the relevance of SQF's effectiveness to the policy's constitutionality? Some argue that taking this question seriously would result in the flagrant disregard of individual rights. Suppose that the law promoted a thoroughgoing commitment to ensuring effective criminal-law enforcement no matter the constitutional constraint by disengaging the exclusionary rule in every people stopped between 2004 and 2009, 89 percent were male, 49 percent were under the age of 25, and 52 percent were African American). case in which there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. The likely result would be the erosion of constitutional rights even if law enforcement effectiveness would increase at the individual level.1o Erosion of rights is obviously a bad outcome. Yet it is also true that the Fourth Amendment in particular calls for a reasonable balance between liberty and order, seemingly an explicit invitation to consider law enforcement effectiveness." An assessment of this balancing of effectiveness invites an empirical approach to determining the scope of constitutional law in this area. 2 Empiricism was star of the show in Floyd in the sense that the case was largely driven by big data. The NYPD's ability to track its productivity by looking to the forms that officers used to document their stops (called UF-250s) was the foundation of its claim that more stops meant less crime. 13 The UF-250s were critical to the plaintiffs' case as well.14 Through close analysis of the forms that the NYPD used to track stops, the Center for Constitutional Rights ("the Center") was able to show that a critical percentage of the stops did not meet Fourth Amendment standards, even though the majority of the stops did. 15 Moreover, the Center used the same data to construct its argument that 12 See, for example, Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Crimin at 763 (cited in note 11) ("There exists research that the Court should have considered and referenced in its opinion that gives some measure of the effectiveness and costs to law enforcement of the Miranda warnings. That research is relevant in deciding whether to continue requiring Miranda procedures. It informs the balancing-of-interests analysis.").
13 See Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 600-01. 14 See id at 559 ("[Pllaintiffs' case was based on the imperfect information contained in the NYPD's database of forms ('UF-250s') that officers are required to prepare after each stop.").
15 See id at 582-83. See also id at 658 (concluding that the "plaintiffs showed that practices resulting in unconstitutional [with respect to the Fourth Amendment] stops and frisks were sufficiently widespread that they had the force of law").
the NYPD was engaged in a racially discriminatory policy and practice in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 In this Essay I want to take seriously the relevance of law enforcement effectiveness and the role of empiricism in understanding the constitutionality of the police practices at issue in Floyd and in urban police practices more generally. I also want to recast the debate a bit. While the media debate centered on the relevance of the effectiveness of the NYPD's SQF, with Scheindlin coming down squarely on the "not relevant" side of the ledger, 1 7 this debate obscured a related but, in my view, more important issue. I believe a more critical issue is the mismatch between the level of analysis at which the Supreme Court articulated the relevant test for constitutional justification of a stop-and-frisk in Terry v Ohio i 8 and the scale at which police today (and historically) engage in stop-and-frisk as a practice. That is, while the Court in Terry authorized police intervention in an individual incident when a police officer possesses less than probable cause to believe that an armed individual is involved in a crime, in reality stop-and-frisk is more typically carried out by a police force en masse as a program.
At first glance it might seem that the point that I am trying to make is not as important as I suggest. Is it not the case that a mass of stops and frisks is simply an aggregation of individual incidents? The answer, in short, is no. When policing agencies engage in an organizationally determined practice of stopping certain "sorts" of people for the stated purpose of preventing or deterring crime, as the NYPD did, they are engaging in what I call a "program." The stops that flow from these programs are not individual incidents that grow organically-endogenouslyout of a collection of individual investigations occurring between an officer and a person that the officer believes to be committing a crime. Rather, programmatic stops are imposed from the top down and are exogenous to the fabric of community-police 16 See id at 572, 583. 17 In her Floyd opinion, Scheindlin cabined the relevance of law enforcement effectiveness from her assessment of the constitutional violations in question. When the defendants attempted to present evidence on the effectiveness of SQF in reducing New York City crime, Scheindlin refused to allow it: "[T]his case is not about the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This Court's mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool. ... 'The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the relations. In Terry, the Court dictated a framework to assess the constitutionality of police action in the endogenous context, but proactive policing of crime does not fit that model. Because proactive policing is carried out differently from the one-off intervention into a crime in progress that Terry concerned, those who are subject to it experience it differently. And it is that reality that fueled the litigation in Floyd.
In order to illustrate the point, let us recall the facts of Terry itself. Officer Martin McFadden, a thirty-nine-year veteran of the Cincinnati police force, observed John Terry and two companions walking back and forth on the sidewalk outside a store for about ten to twelve minutes. 19 McFadden suspected that the men were "casing a job" in preparation for a robbery, so he also suspected that they were armed.20 He approached the men, identified himself, and asked for their names. 21 28 Further, if that court had analyzed each stop-andfrisk individually, the court might have assumed that, because police get it right most of the time, it would be a good idea to give police a great deal of discretion to intervene in criminal incidents that unfold before them in order to keep the public safe. Nevertheless, despite the fact that most stops likely are constitutional when measured individually under Terry, when a mass of stops are considered in the aggregate, the data make clear that police are not investigating people that they suspect to be committing particular crimes in progress but are instead proactively policing people that they suspect could be offenders.29 The data show that the "suspects" that police encounter the vast majority of the time do not possess guns or contraband, are never arrested, and are very rarely processed criminally.30 Yet, because the Fourth Amendment does not allow police to engage a person and interfere with her rights of privacy and autonomy unless that officer has reason to believe that she is engaged in crime, the observing public may assume that those who are 28 It is critical, of course, to understand that the ability to make this determination will depend on the account of the justification for the stop that is being reviewed. In Floyd, the account of what justified the stops came from forms containing boxes supplying predetermined reasons that officers could check off, and there is reason to question the credibility of those accounts. See Fagan Report at *55 (cited in note 1) (concluding that at least 68.9 percent of stops, and as many as 93.3 percent, were legally justified).
29 stopped by police are committing or are about to commit a criminal offense. 31 Although the constitutional framework is based on a one-off investigative incident, many of those who are stopped-the majority of them young men of color-do not experience the stops as one-off incidents. Young men of color experience the stops as a program to police them as a group, which is, of course, the reality.3, Fourth Amendment reasonableness must account for this fact.
I. SYSTEMATIC STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK
It is important to understand why the NYPD engaged in a strategy of making several hundred thousand stops yearly for almost a decade starting in the early 2000s. It seems almost unimaginable now, but in 1990 the homicide rate for New York City was 30.7 per 100,000. 34 The sharp decline in crime had certainly already begun by the mid-1990s when William Bratton, the NYPD's celebrated commissioner, reinvented the department as a leader in innovative policing strategies such as COMPSTAT and order-maintenance policing.36 Bratton, and later, Commissioner Raymond Kelly, brought an aggressive policing style to the city, and SQF was the engine.36 The NYPD 36 The policing style is sometimes referred to as "broken windows" following James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's celebrated Atlantic Monthly article of the same name. See generally James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic argued that its SQF strategy was a good policy choice in that it effectively deterred violent crime by deterring people from carrying guns. 37 It turns out that this argument has a decades-long history that precedes even Terry.
As Professor David Sklansky notes, the 1950s saw the rise of the "second wave" of police professionalism, rooted in "good government managerialism."38 In cities across the country, local governments turned to ideas of professionalism, and at least some officials used police professionalism to disentangle urban policing agencies from graft politics. 39 The theory driving this wave of professionalism was supplied by an earlier generation of criminal justice theorists including Professor August Vollmer.40 Vollmer's student, professor and policing-professionalism advocate O.W. Wilson, started to emphasize a concrete but limited role for police agencies. Wilson and his followers believed that policing agencies could do little about the root causes of crime, such as poverty and mental illness. But Wilson argued that police could deter criminal activity by increasing the likelihood that offenders would be caught or by reducing the opportunities for offenders to commit crime.41 A key plank of the professionalization agenda arose from these ideas. Police should seek out offenders rather than wait for victims to report crime. Hill 4th ed 1977) . This text explains that patrol has four purposes: to repress crime by reducing the opportunity for it; to prevent crime by engaging with potential offenders and redirecting them to more positive behaviors; to investigate potential crimes; and, finally, to be available for noncriminal services such as resolving family arguments. See id. The situation presented in Terry fits in the third category, while most SQF falls more easily into the first two categories.
42 Id at 347:
Another fundamental technique is the systematic use of field interrogation. Patrol officers should talk to as many people as possible during routine patrol activities, and in particular they should contact as many potential offenders as they can. In situations in which "stop and frisk" action would be permissible, Thomas Cahill, the longest-serving police chief in San Francisco's history, took seriously this principle of professional policing. Cahill believed that preventing crime was more important than clearing cases. "[C]learing a case," he said, "will not bring back the victim."
44 Accordingly, in the 1950s, a full decade before Terry was decided, Cahill launched "Operation S" on the streets of San Francisco. "S" stood for saturation, and the program called for flooding San Francisco's high crime areas with roughly fifty officers who stopped, questioned, frisked, and arrested on vagrancy charges suspicious characters who police believed were about to break the law. 4 5 In situations that did not result in arrest, police were instructed to fill out identification cards, which the San Francisco Chronicle later approvingly reported could be used to generate suspect lists for crimes occurring in the area. 46 The number of stops that Operation S generated was prodigious for the times. Historian Robert Fogelson reported that, in its first year, Operation S tallied twenty thousand stops, most of which were of young black men. 47 Does this program sound familiar?
By the time that the late Professors James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland wrote The Effect of the Police on Crime in 1978, post-Terry, they were not writing on a blank slate. 4s Based on an analysis of the robbery rates of thirty-five cities, Wilson and Boland urged police to shift from random police patrol to a more aggressive and "legalistic" style of policing aimed at maximizing the number of interactions with and observations of a relevant community. 49 The authors' analysis included data consistent with the argument that cities with high levels of traffic citations officers should obtain information from persons which can be filed for future reference. 43 had fewer robberies than those with low levels.[ 0 A few cities followed their recommendation, but the approach did not achieve real national penetration until Professor Lawrence Sherman's "The Kansas City Gun Experiment" seemed to confirm James Q. Wilson's hypothesis.51
Focusing on one police beat in Kansas City, Sherman and his research team conducted a quasi experiment for twenty-nine weeks in which beat officers attempted three strategiesincluding field interrogation-designed to increase gun seizures for the purpose of reducing violent crime. 52 At the experiment's end, total gun seizures were up by 65 percent, and the number of guns found in car checks was triple the number seized prior to the experiment's commencement in the same area. 53 Additionally, the rate of guns seized in the experimental district was much higher than the rate of seizure in the matched control district.
54
Gun crime went down precipitously in the treatment districtdeclining by 49 percent-while there was almost no change in the control district. 5 Additionally, Sherman and his coauthors found little evidence of crime displacement away from the area of intensive treatment. 56 Scores of cities rushed to follow the Kansas City model, including, perhaps most famously, New York City.57
It is critical to understand that the strategy that James Q. Wilson and Boland envisioned-and the strategy that was actually carried out in Kansas City-is a program. In other words, stop-and-frisk under this approach is not simply a tool on the officer's belt to be used when the situation is right, such as intervening in a crime in progress, which was the factual scenario presented in Terry. Rather, good policing is articulated from the top down throughout the entire agency to include aggressive, systematic, "legalistic" field interrogations designed to suppress crime.5 There is a distinct consequence of this approach. In the program context, police on patrol looking to prevent crime do not seek out particular crimes in progress. Instead, they engage in assessments of suspicious characteristics-clothes that are out of season, suspicious bulges in clothing, furtive movements, age, gender, and so on. 59 Ideally, an officer will keep an eye on the person who exhibits enough suspicious characteristics and wait until that person engages in some kind of activity that justifies the officer's interference. Less ideally, the officer will act simply on the basis of suspicious characteristics, making an assumption that anyone who looks a certain way is someone who could be a person about to engage in crime.60 This logical leap comes very close to the constitutional line; Terry and its progeny are quite clear that an officer must be "specific" and "reasonable" in inferring that criminal activity is actually "afoot;" an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' will not suffice.61 Of course, when police engage in this kind of policing it is inevitable-at least without randomization-that certain groups will have more contact with police than will other groups. 62 James Q. My argument here is that programmatic stop-and-frisk drives categorical judgments. There is, of course, a feedback loop between court judgments and programmatic stop-and-frisk. When courts endorse particular factors as legitimate for officers to consider in an individual case, those factors are folded into a policy and can then be pushed down from the top as factors for officers to consider when carrying out the program. Thus, "high crime areas" and "furtive movements" have become factors justifying reasonable suspicion.
61 Terry, 392 US at 27, 30. 62 See Harcourt and Meares, 78 U Chi L Rev at 815 (cited in note 59) ("The only way to [search within the group] without injecting bias and prejudice is to randomly search the group, because randomization allows us to select from the group while avoiding illegitimate criteria to discriminate within the group.").
63 Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, NY Times Magazine at 46 (cited in note 51).
II. MEASURING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROGRAM
Judge Scheindlin noted "the inherent difficulty in making findings and conclusions regarding 4.4 million stops."64 It was practically impossible to analyze each stop individually according to the Terry standard.65 Instead, the plaintiffs' case relied on the information about each stop documented in a form-the UF-250-that NYPD officers were required to fill out after each stop.66 Despite obvious validity problems with analyzing the forms, Scheindlin relied on the estimate provided by the plaintiffs' expert witness, Professor Jeffrey Fagan, that at least 6.7 percent-and perhaps as many as 31.1 percent-of the stops were made without reasonable suspicion.67 This means that 93.3 percent of the stops (a liberal estimate, to be sure) could be considered constitutional. Is that good enough to justify the practice? Is it good enough if the approach is reducing crime? Does it matter whether the approach is really effective or just barely effective? Can we even ask these questions?
It probably matters whether we ask these questions in the context of the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, crime control is obviously relevant because the Amendment authorizes police action in the first place. There should be a close connection between stops and frisks and crime, given that the point of stops and frisks either at the incident or program level is to intervene in or to prevent crime. The job of officers is to act when they acquire enough information to believe that crime is afoot. In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the potential relevance of effectiveness at crime reduction is more complicated, because the question is not whether the state has a good reason to act, but instead whether the enforcement that the state has engaged in, whether justified under the Fourth Amendment or not, is based on race. If a court finds that the state has made an 64 Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 559. 65 See id. 66 See id. Two problems should be immediately obvious. First, it is not clear that officers necessarily filled out a form every time that they stopped someone, so the forms likely undercount the number of stops. Second, there is a basic credibility problem: How does one know whether the reasons that an officer checks off on the forms constitute the real reasons that he or she stopped and possibly frisked a suspect? See Fagan Report at *55 (cited in note 1). 67 [82:159 impermissible racial classification, the burden shifts to the state to show that its practice is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling interest. In theory, the city could make an argument that crime reduction is such an interest.
The city did not provide a legal argument as to the relevance of effectiveness because Scheindlin would not allow it, but one can engage in a thought experiment regarding the kind of evidence that the city might have presented with respect to the Fourth Amendment question. Recall that the genesis of the New York strategy and its progeny can be traced to James Q. Wilson and Boland's 1978 Law and Society article advocating proactive and aggressive police activity-"legalistic" policing-that focuses on issuing many citations and questioning disorderly people at high rates in order to reduce the overall crime rate. 68 It may come as a surprise that the idea was a bold one at the time: police could actually reduce crime. Although O.W. Wilson and others had made police effectiveness at crime reduction a central plank of police professionalism, there was little empirical evidence at the time that police could actually achieve this goal.69 By the late 1970s, most police scholars had given up the ghost on this point. 70 James Q. Wilson and Boland were still in the fight, however. They hypothesized that the aggressive-patrol approach could work for two reasons. First, aggressive policing could affect crime rates indirectly by increasing the incidence of weapons detection2 1 Second, stops and frisks could impact crime directly by changing potential offenders' perceptions about their risk of apprehension, as the activity is a visible indicator of police presence. 72 Wilson and Boland's claim was that the effect of aggressive patrol could occur even if the practice did not lead to a higher rate of solved crimes. If they were right, then police alone could make a difference in crime, rather than merely being 68 See text accompanying notes 48-50. 69 The conventional wisdom at the time was that police had no impact on crime whatsoever. See, for example, David H. Bayley, Police for the Future 9 (Oxford 1994):
The plain fact is that police actions cannot be shown to reduce the amount of crime. ... The damning conclusion that the police are not preventing crime rests entirely on a large body of research undertaken for the most part during the 1970s. Try as they might, researchers were unable, often at considerable cost, to show that the number of police, the amount of money spent on police, or the methods police use had any effect on crime. This is still the consensus among experts. 70 One basic problem with the NYPD's reliance on effectiveness to support the constitutionality of its policy is, as I noted above, the fact that two provisions of the Constitution were relevant in the litigation, not one. The Floyd plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment requires that police possess the requisite amount of information about a suspect before interfering with her privacy and autonomy. Terry and its progeny specify that level of information as reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (to justify a stop) and reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous (to justify a frisk). The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, is concerned with state decisionmaking that produces racially disparate impacts when such decisions are made with discriminatory purpose.
Scheindlin's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment liability findings are importantly intertwined, because racial disproportion in stops and frisks alone does not provide a foundation for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 74 Terry teaches that police . The study's authors do not conclude that SQF had no impact on crime, but they note that "if there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy." Id at 117-18. I caution that, despite the fact that this study may be the best analysis of the relationship between stops and the crime decline in New York City, it too suffers from problems of validity. must show reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot or has occurred before stopping someone. Therefore, one would expect that more stops and frisks would occur in high crime areas when those stops are being carried out in a manner that comports with the Fourth Amendment. Because the demographics of New York City are such that the higher-crime areas contain a higher proportion of African American and Hispanic residents, one would expect, all else equal, that police would stop people of color disproportionately to their representation in the city's population if they chose, as Fourth Amendment doctrine seems to direct, to focus on so-called high crime areas. 75 That is, legal policing of the streets of New York most likely would burden African Americans more than other groups because of the connection between race, place, and crime. 76 Professor Fagan's analysis of millions of NYPD UF-250 forms casts doubt on the conclusion that the NYPD's actions were obviously legal, however. In his expert report, Fagan shows that the racial composition of a neighborhood is a statistically significant predictor of the number of police stops even when controlling for police-reported measures of crime, police-patrol allocations, and other social conditions in that neighborhood. 77 Fagan's regressions test for whether crime rates explain the NYPD's stop practices after controlling for population size and race of the relevant area's population, net of other factors such as poverty, education level, and the like. If police were attempting to address crime through stop activity, one would expect the level of stops to increase in tandem with crime in any given area, net of other factors. This relationship is clearly what the Terry standard directs. However, Fagan's findings consistently reveal that the racial composition of an area predicted stop patterns over and above the contribution made by crime. 78 In fact, the level of violent crime in an area, somewhat surprisingly, did not make any contribution to explaining the level of stops in high crime areas. Thus, while the NYPD claimed to engage in a strategy to deter gun crimes by deploying officers to places exhibiting the highest crime rates, statistical analysis indicates that the department blanketed certain neighborhoods with patrol officers and directed those officers to "stop the right people," justifying this policy choice with self-perpetuating statistics indicating that large percentages of New Yorkers arrested for gun crimes were black or Hispanic. 79 The policy amounted to stopping large numbers of people of color "in general" for the purpose of preventing crime-in express contravention of Terry's specific teachings that each and every individual stop must be based on specific, articulable facts indicative of criminal activity.80
III. THE MISMATCH
The Floyd decision is importantly driven by data, which both sides could use to illustrate the potential public benefits of SQF-crime reduction-as well as the costs to the public in the form of massive numbers of unjustified police encounters. The typical stop-and-frisk case is not data driven. In the typical case, a court, in order to determine whether a police officer complied with the Fourth Amendment, will listen to the officer tell the story of an individual incident and then assess retrospectively whether that officer had enough information to disturb the target's privacy and autonomy. While one might think that this approach makes sense in individual criminal cases (in the 77 See Fagan Report at *30-33 (cited in note 1).
78 See id at *35-39. 79 Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 667 & n 782. 80 Id at 664 (emphasis omitted).
[82:159 extremely rare case in which a stop results in a prosecution), which constitute over 90 percent of Terry claims,81 the reality of urban policing clearly overwhelms the structure of the rule. Monitoring stops individually through the exclusionary rule attempts to shape policing policy after the fact by addressing decisions of individual officers, rather than those at the management level, where programmatic policing is dictated. This means that a problematic policy that drives a small, but critically important, percentage of stops is unlikely to ever be changed. One hopes that managers are enlightened enough to change these policies on their own without litigation, but clearly litigation like Floyd can help. The litigation makes an important contribution by matching, through the innovative use of data, the level of constitutional analysis to the scale of the program. This kind of analysis can highlight the good-apparently officers usually comply with the Constitution-and the bad: in a significant percentage of cases, police do not comply with the Constitution, and when they do not, the burden falls disproportionately on racial minorities. Considering stops as a program reveals something else. Justification of decisionmaking is not the only game in town. The scale of the program matters whether the stops are justified or not. And so does the racial composition of stops, even when they are justified under the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that racial minorities in cities disproportionately encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional contexts fuels those minorities' perceptions of the illegitimacy of the police.82 Qualitative research is especially helpful to illustrate this point. Professors Jacinta Gau and Rod Brunson interviewed St. Louis youth in an attempt to uncover their relationship with local police8 3 Their analysis revealed that a key driver of the relationship was the youth's perception of widespread stops and frisks. "Respondents felt that their neighborhoods had been besieged by police .... Many study participants ... characterized their involuntary contacts with the police as demeaning and of inordinate frequency." 84 In Gau and Brunson's sample, nearly 78 percent of respondents reported being stopped at least once in their lives, with approximately sixteen as the mean number of times stopped.85 Although Gau and Brunson's respondents acknowledged the need for police to be involved in crime-control efforts and even to detain "suspicious looking people," they could not understand "why police would target them when they were engaged in clearly lawful activities."86 Gau and Brunson's work echoes additional qualitative research from New York documenting strained relationships between Latino youth and the NYPD, fueled by harsh treatment during routine stops and frisks without cause or explanation.87 CONCLUSION One of the most notable features of the constitutionalization of criminal procedure in the 1960s was the Supreme Court's focus on the realities of street policing and investigation, and the impact of such activities on individual freedoms. Judicial decisions of that era routinely centered on empirical issues surrounding the effectiveness of police practices and their impact on liberty interests. As the Court recognized and embraced realworld experience, it rejected the formalism of nineteenthcentury Fourth Amendment doctrine. In so doing, the Court began to describe constitutional criminal procedure rights as guaranteeing a balance between liberty and order. In Terry, the Court acknowledged the importance of monitoring effectiveness by requiring "reasonable suspicion" rather than "probable cause" to justify stop-and-frisk encounters. order in assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 88 The decision in Terry was in line with others, such as that in Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 8 9 in which the Court eschewed a requirement that an individual be told explicitly that she has a right to refuse a search in a consensual-search context. 90 In Schneckloth, the Court actually defined the concept of voluntariness as the accommodation of the legitimate need for the search as against the "requirement of assuring the absence of coercion"-a balance between liberty and order. 91 When Terry was decided, crime was on the rise, and the Court was cognizant of the increasing demand for public safety. It made sense for the Court to recognize the need for police officers to intervene in situations that they had carefully observed grow organically before a crime has actually occurred. To do so is just good police work that keeps people safe. If the briefs are evidence of the Court's thinking regarding factors on which a police officer should rely before engaging a citizen, then the factors offered by the United States as amicus in Terry are instructive:
1. The time of day. 2. The place where the suspect is observed. 3. The incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood. 4. The law enforcement officer's prior knowledge of the suspect. 5. The appearance of the suspect; i.e., whether he resembles someone whom the police are seeking. 6. The pre-detention conduct of the suspect and his companions. 7. The experience of the law enforcement officer. 8. The seriousness of the suspected offense. 
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[that] ought not to be indulged in, [because] the focus should be on the facts of the particular case." 3 The Terry Court cautioned against the generalized practice of stopping certain individuals, particularly members of minority groups, observing in a footnote that stops could be a source of friction between the police and the community, as "[m]isuse of field interrogations increases as more police departments adopt aggressive patrol in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident. 94 The Court even acknowledged, as I did above, that, in cases of broad misuse of field interrogations, the exclusionary rule would do little to change the practice.95 The exclusionary rule likely works best in cases in which both the reason for the police officer's action and his or her explanation for that action are individuated. That is one reason why the decision in Terry makes so much sense. The case involved a police officer who was already in a neighborhood engaging in locally legitimate police work and who saw a crime in progress and tried to stop it. Even youths in tough urban neighborhoods recognize the need for this kind of police work, as Gau and Brunson's interviews show. But, as Fagan's data analyses make clear, when SQF is a program, street officers' decisions to stop people do not grow out of investigations in situ, but rather are made exogenously, before police actually get on the ground. The youths that Brunson and Gau interviewed are absolutely correct that there is no legitimacy in such stops except in the most abstract sense, because the cause for police action and the explanation are not really about the individual that the officer has observed. Terry was about balancing the rights of police and the rights of citizens in situ, but SQF as a program changes this equation.
A programmatic understanding of stop-and-frisk more accurately reflects reality, because stop-and-frisk generally is implemented as a program. In fact, while it is not clear whether the justices deciding Terry appreciated this fact, there is a great deal of evidence indicating that, at least in major cities, programmatic stop-and-frisk was regular police practice before Terry was decided. reveals the true costs of stop-and-frisk, because those who experience SQF-primarily young men of color-experience it as a program and not as an individual incident. 9 1 Moreover, they experience the program as a group, not as individuals, because the program is suspect driven, not incident driven.
I have argued that the Fourth Amendment ought to take these considerations into account and that to do this, statisticsrather than stories about stops-are necessary. Today, unlike in 1968, both data and better vehicles for assessing good policing are available. We can use the data to figure out how to enhance public safety and to ensure that the burden of policing is distributed in a way that is not unlawful and that enhances trust and legitimacy in policing.98 Moreover, we need not wait until there is a constitutional violation to use the data to refine and enhance policing along the dimensions that we care about, which include, among others, public safety, respect for individual rights, and enhanced procedural justice. 99 Newer procedural mechanisms, such as § 14141,100 can help to shape policing,o1 and there are policy-oriented police executives all over the country who want to get this right by imposing guidelines administratively. This is the new brief for professional policing. We can have both safer streets and more-democratic policing.
